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The Case for Valuing Non-Health and Indirect Benefits
Govind Persad and Jessica du Toit

i 	
Introduction
Health policy is only one part of social policy. Although spending administered
by the health sector constitutes a sizeable fraction of total state spending in most
countries, other sectors such as education and transportation also represent major
portions of national budgets. Additionally, though health is one important aspect
of economic and social activity, people pursue many other goals in their social
and economic lives. Similarly, direct benefits—those that are immediate results
of health policy choices—are only a small portion of the overall impact of health
policy. This chapter considers what weight health policy should give to its “spillover effects,” namely non-health and indirect benefits.
Definitions and the State of the Debate over Indirect and
Non-H ealth Benefits
Many health policy choices produce indirect and non-
health benefits. For
instance—as we will discuss—investing resources into treating infections acquired by new mothers produces an indirect benefit to their newborn children.
It also produces many non-health benefits for the mothers, such as improved
finances and greater capacity for social participation.
Govind Persad and Jessica du Toit, The Case for Valuing Non-Health and Indirect Benefits In: Global Health
Priority-Setting. Edited by: Ole F. Norheim, Ezekiel J. Emanuel, and Joseph Millum, Oxford University
Press (2020), © Oxford University Press.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190912765.003.0012
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In light of the heated debate over the proper definition of health,1 we adopt
a definition of non-health benefits that should be compatible with any definition of health: a non-health benefit is any benefit that is not a health benefit. Though we sometimes use specific examples of what we assume constitute
health or non-health benefits, readers can always choose a different example
that fits their preferred account of health. Most questions about the relative
priority of health and non-health benefits do not hinge on which definition of
health is adopted.2
Defining indirect benefits is more complex. Some define indirectness in
terms of purpose: an intervention’s indirect benefits comprise its unintended
but beneficial results. Others define indirectness in terms of causal distance: on
such a definition, an intervention’s indirect benefits are all its beneficial but
not causally immediate results. Still others define indirect benefits using a “recipient conception,” on which indirect benefits are solely those that result from
the improved health of individuals who receive direct benefits (e.g., economic
benefits resulting from the greater productivity of workers who receive direct
benefits).
Dan Brock suggests that “if benefits of health interventions are indirect
they are usually non-health as well, and vice versa.”3 We agree. However, this
does not reflect any conceptual connection between indirect and non-health
benefits, but rather the fact that the indirect and non-health benefits of most
interventions are far more numerous than their direct or health benefits. This
has much to do with the sheer breadth of what counts as an indirect or a non-
health benefit.
The most prominent defenses of the claim that indirect and non-health benefits
should be ignored or given lower priority have come from Brock and from Frances
Kamm.4 Kamm and Brock both draw on work outside the medical context: Kamm
appeals to Immanuel Kant’s idea that people should not be treated as mere means,5
while Brock appeals to Michael Walzer’s theory of separate spheres.6 Meanwhile,
the opposite view has been defended by Kasper Lippert-R asmussen and Sigurd
Lauridsen2 and more recently (in the context of indirect benefits) by Jessica du
Toit and Joseph Millum.7
This chapter will defend the view that indirect and non-health benefits should
not be given lower priority than direct health benefits, and will do so specifically
in the context of priority-setting in global health. Its approach can be conceptualized as a criticism of two existing approaches to health policy, which we call No
Consideration and Unequal Consideration:
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• No Consideration approaches give no weight at all to non-health and/or
indirect benefits when determining which health policies to adopt.
• Unequal Consideration approaches give lesser weight to non-health and/or
indirect benefits when determining which health policies to adopt.
The chapter concludes that there is a decisive case against No Consideration
approaches. It also concludes that there is a compelling case against Unequal
Consideration approaches, and therefore in favor of giving no special consideration
to direct health benefits as such.
Indirect and Non-H ealth Benefits: A Case Study
To see how a medical intervention has indirect and non-health benefits, consider
a case discussed by Miljeteig et al. in Chapter 3: payment for antibiotic treatment
to cure a postpartum infection suffered by a new mother (Figure 12.1). We analyze
some categories of indirect benefits produced by the intervention in Table 12.1.
Funding the intervention has the intended and immediate (direct) benefit
to the patient of curing the infection, but it also has a variety of indirect, non-
health effects. For instance, it has a direct non-health benefit to third parties by
preventing health workers from having to pay out of pocket for patients’ medicines,
a phenomenon Miljeteig et al. discuss. This benefit can in turn produce indirect
non-health benefits; for instance, it can benefit health workers’ dependents by
freeing up resources to be spent on their education. It also has indirect health
effects because it reduces the odds that the newborn will contract the mother’s infection, which improves its health and its longer-term educational prospects. And
it produces indirect, non-health benefits for the new mother by improving her
finances and earning power, which will likely in turn improve her health in other
ways (an indirect health benefit) and enable her to gain more education. Improved
education and wealth for the new mother is also likely to improve the health of her
newborn. The intervention also has health and non-health costs not represented
in Figure 12.1, such as opportunity costs to the health care system and the potential encouragement of antibiotic resistance.
In an environment of finite resources, health policy must not only deliver
interventions but also set priorities. Because interventions differ not only in the
direct health benefits they produce but also in the indirect and non-health benefits
they produce, priority-setting decisions frequently will depend on what weight, if
any, health policy assigns to indirect and non-health benefits.

Improved
finances for
hospital staff

Figure 12.1. Some effects of a medical intervention.
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Table 12.1.
Categories of Indirect Benefits
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Why Might Indirect or Non-H ealth Benefits Warrant Lower
Priority?
This section will evaluate several arguments for the conclusion that health policy
should ignore indirect and non-health benefits or give them less weight:
1. Health policy actors have a role obligation to prioritize provision of direct
health benefits.
2. The purpose of the goods distributed by health policy is the provision of
direct health benefits.
3. Direct health benefits are more important than other benefits.
4. An adversarial system where health policy focuses on the provision of direct health benefits, while other policy areas focus on other benefits, will
lead to better overall results.
5. Given the breadth of what counts as an indirect or non-health benefit, if
health policy pays (equal) attention to these benefits, we risk giving (equal)
weight in health care allocation and prioritization choices to effects about
which we have imperfect information.
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Role Obligations
The claim that certain health professionals are obliged to prioritize the provision
of direct health benefits has been most debated at the micro-level of health promotion, which involves interactions between health professionals and their patients.
Many accounts describe physicians’ role obligations as especially focused on promoting the health of the patient in front of them.8 However, others have pointed
out that patients have interests other than health.9 This has engendered a debate
regarding what weight physicians should give to values such as respect for patients’
autonomy, preservation of their financial solvency, or promotion of public health.
For instance, the antibiotic that most reliably cures postpartum infection may be
the most expensive for patients or may already be overused, posing the danger of
antibiotic resistance and ensuing bad consequences for public health.
Even if physicians’ roles oblige them to give special weight to direct health
benefits, those involved in making and implementing health policy likely have
different role obligations. These actors have no fiduciary obligation to specific
patients, and their expertise is not exclusively focused on the provision of health
care. Indeed, health policy implementation is sometimes intertwined with the provision of non-health benefits. For instance, in the United States, the primary federal agency implementing health policy is the Department of Health and Human
Services, which is responsible not only for health care programs like Medicare and
Medicaid but also for the provision of non-health benefits such as early childhood
education, refugee resettlement, and energy assistance. This renders dubious the
claim that the internal morality of health policy requires giving special weight to
health benefits.
Role obligations can also arise via delegation rather than being internal to a
role, if the authority delegated to health policymakers comes with the proviso that
it will be used to secure direct health benefits rather than indirect or non-health
benefits. Whether authority is in fact delegated in this way represents an empirical question; in the section later in this chapter on adversarial efficiency, we evaluate one argument in favor of a policy of such delegation.
The Purpose of Health Care
The purpose or meaning of health care may appear to support giving special priority to direct health benefits when distributing health care. Frances Kamm has
argued that certain resources (such as medicines) should be used for the purpose
for which they are specifically designed.4 However, Kamm’s argument faces several problems. First, no consensus exists regarding the purpose of many medical

3
1
2

Non-Health and Indirect Benefits

j 213

resources.7 Further, assigning moral weight to purpose seems vulnerable to a
variety of reductio ad absurdum arguments. Consider the case of thalidomide, a
teratogenic drug initially developed and prescribed as a sedative but later discovered to be a cancer treatment. Kamm’s view would appear to count against the
use of thalidomide to treat cancer, because thalidomide was originally developed
and marketed as a sedative, though its risks when used as a sedative far outweigh
its benefits. This objection might be rebutted by redescribing thalidomide’s purpose in a more general way, for instance as health promotion rather than sedation.
However, even after such redescription, a purpose-based view continues to have
bizarre implications. For instance, it would imply that there would be something
wrong about selling an antique bottle of thalidomide to raise money for educational efforts.
Furthermore, health care is only a small part of what health policymakers distribute. As Brock concedes, when the resource being distributed is money, “no direct argument that the distinctive end of what is being distributed is health seems
applicable.”3 The same seems true for many other resources, such as legal protection or infrastructure. So even if a purpose-based argument like Kamm’s can survive the above objections, its applicability is limited.
The Unique Importance of Health
The purpose-of-health-care argument involved the allocation of a means, health
care. In contrast, the argument that health is uniquely important involves the allocation of an end, namely health. Because indirect and direct health benefits both
improve health, the argument that health is uniquely important does not favor direct over indirect benefits. It does, however, favor health benefits over non-health
benefits.
Brock uses Michael Walzer’s “separate spheres” argument to support the claim
that health is uniquely important. Walzer contends that different distributive
principles apply to different sorts of goods: education should be distributed by
different rules than money, and health by a rule different from either. However,
even if we agree with Walzer that health is unique—that it should be distributed differently from other goods and cannot simply be subsumed under the general category of well-being10—this is not enough to support prioritizing health
benefits. Consider an analogy: you, the reader, are special and different from every
other person, but this does not justify the conclusion that we should prioritize
you over others. The uniqueness of health will only justify prioritizing health
benefits if health is also uniquely important—a conclusion for which the separate
spheres approach offers no support. If health policy focuses only on optimizing
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health outcomes, it may render the distribution of other goods highly suboptimal.
Contrary to what Lippert-R asmussen and Lauridsen suggest, the separate spheres
approach does not ignore the effects of the distribution of health on the distribution of other goods.2 Such an interpretation of the separate spheres approach
confuses Walzer’s stance that we should strive to minimize the effects of health on
other goods with the much less plausible claim that we should ignore those effects
even if they exist. Walzer’s stance is that we should publicly fund universal health
care in order to ensure that an individual’s health does not affect her access to non-
health goods; it does not follow, and Walzer does not argue, that in the absence of
publicly funded universal health care, we should ignore the effects of health care
costs on the distribution of other goods.6 Rather, we should ensure that health
care provision does not (for instance, through its costs) lead to a maldistribution
of other goods.11
An argument that health is not only unique but uniquely important must therefore rest on some basis other than separate spheres. One such basis would be the
claim that health is a paramount good that must not be sacrificed to any other.
This claim seems most plausible when we consider certain aspects of health, such
as being alive rather than dead: other goods, such as education or political participation, are of no value to a dead person. Yet even the value of life can reasonably
be sacrificed in order to achieve other goods: consider an individual who risks her
life in order to participate politically, or—more prosaically—exposes herself to the
risk of death on the road in order to commute to school. This is true not only for
risks to health, but even sometimes for direct health losses: consider a mother
who endures pain to give birth to a child, or a soldier who sacrifices life itself to
block a grenade blast. These tradeoffs become even more plausible when we consider aspects of health less central than life itself.
Another basis for giving health special weight is Norman Daniels’s claim that
“health is of special moral importance because it contributes to the range of opportunities open to us.”12 Allen Buchanan has persuasively argued that employing Daniels’s
approach to justify what we call a No Consideration view, on which health benefits are
given exclusive priority, will lead to absurd conclusions such as the investment of
all resources in those who are critically ill.13 But examination of Daniels’s claim also
reveals that giving health benefits greater priority than other benefits merely because of the kind of benefits they are—the view we called Unequal Consideration—is
mistaken. As Lippert-Rasmussen and Lauridsen observe,
Because healthcare often plays a more important role in preserving a normal
range of opportunities than, say, modest extra income . . . in general, one
should not ignore the healthcare needs of the unemployed in order to give
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better treatment to economically productive people. However, it is also clear
that some non-health-related interests, such as basic education, are no less
important determinants of one’s range of opportunities than health is.2
Though some types of health benefits serve as what we might call “keystone benefits”
for preserving a normal opportunity range, the same is true for some non-health
benefits. Similarly, some health and non-health benefits are not crucial to maintaining
a normal range of opportunity. Accordingly, the goal of ensuring that each individual
enjoys a normal opportunity range does not support assigning any benefit greater
priority merely because of the type of benefit it is. Rather, we should provide whatever package of benefits best secures equality of opportunity.
Adversarial Efficiency
Many claim that administrative agencies and ministries each pursue disparate goals, rather than all pursuing some overarching goal such as the
common good. Brock, for instance, quotes Robert Goodin’s claim that “it is
the Health Minister’s job to look after health, and spend her money however
best promotes health; any spillovers to non-health matters, be they positive or
negative, are naturally neglected by her on the grounds ‘that’s not my department.’ ”3 Similarly, Daniel Hausman claims that “contemporary governments
assign different goals to different sectors.”10 If understood as describing how
health system administrators do make decisions, Goodin and Hausman may be
correct. But their observations do not support the claim that administrators
should make decisions this way.
What could support the claim that health ministries should focus only on health
outcomes and ignore other outcomes? One argument for this would be the extension of Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” argument—that the pursuit of disparate,
individual interests by private firms and consumers ultimately serves the common
good14—into the public sector. However, the factors that make invisible-hand reasoning work well in the private sector may not apply in the public sector. The case
for competition among private-sector actors is that competition can “grow the
pie,” increasing the resources available to society as a whole. In contrast, competition between administrative agencies or ministries is often over a pie of resources
whose size is fixed. Many contend that adversarial competition between agencies
who each seek to maximize the achievement of their own goals takes society farther from realizing the best outcomes.15
To see how ministries reasoning in the way Goodin describes could create suboptimal outcomes, consider an example: introducing an invasive insectivore species
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could reduce the incidence of malaria, but would do so at a cost to ecosystems that
is so high that (from a neutral perspective) it outweighs the gain in health. Goodin’s
imagined health ministry would order that the predator be introduced with no concern for ecosystems. Meanwhile, the ministry responsible for environmental protection would spend its own money to eradicate the invasive species, without any
concern for the malaria deaths caused by its actions. The waste of funds would be immense: agencies at such cross-purposes recall not Smith’s invisible hand but rather
O. Henry’s Gift of the Magi, in which the husband sells his watch to buy his wife hair
ornaments, while his wife sells her hair to buy him a watch-chain. Even having the
ministry of health give only special, rather than exclusive, weight to health benefits
would have similarly wasteful, albeit less drastic, consequences.
Further, even if invisible-hand principles can spur government to greater efficiency, these principles would not be best implemented by having different policy
actors embrace disparate ends. Rather, returning to the distinction between ends
and means, competition may be beneficial if policymakers employ disparate means
with a view to best promoting the common good. Health policymakers, for instance, will develop proposals for employing health care to improve the common
good; policymakers in education will suggest employing educational resources to
do the same. Importantly, however, all policy actors will frame their proposals in
terms of contribution to the same ultimate end.
Imperfect Information
What would a health policy that gave equal weight to indirect and non-health
benefits look like? Brock worries that such a policy would be impractical to
implement:
Restricting benefit assessment to direct health benefits has the practical advantage of substantially limiting the scope of the assessment. Once we begin
giving weight to the indirect non-health benefits of health interventions
there is no obvious stopping point stretching out in time and in non-health
domains beyond which we need not go. The more extensive the consequences
to which we give weight the more tenuous and unreliable our estimations of
them are likely to be. We risk soon finding ourselves giving significant weight
in health care allocation and prioritization choices to effects whose nature,
size, and probability are highly uncertain.3
We are skeptical that ignoring indirect and non-health benefits can claim the
mantle of practicality. Even if easy measurability has some weight, what is
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measured cannot depart too far from what is actually valuable. It may be very
difficult to organize nationwide voting or polling and very easy to take a poll of
one’s classroom: however, if our goal is ensuring that political decisions represent
and serve the general public, a vote by 20 or 30 students—despite being easy—
does a much worse job of achieving our actual goal. Even if accounting for indirect
and non-health benefits is difficult, ignoring them will make it difficult for health
policy to achieve desirable outcomes.
If we are right, health policy needs to rest on a broader base of empirical evidence that takes account of the indirect and non-health effects of health policy
interventions. This supports greater investment in policy evaluation. In the interim, however, some steps could be taken to improve the extent to which health
policy considers non-health values. Many have argued for “health in all policies”
initiatives, in which policymakers from non-health sectors are directed to consider
the health effects of their proposals.16 Such initiatives should be paired with similar “all policies in health” efforts, which empower health policymakers to consider
the effects of their proposed policies on the distribution of non-health goods and
give them the tools to assess those effects.
Special Problems in the Distribution of Indirect and
Non-H ealth Benefits
Many distributive justice questions arise whether or not health policy takes indirect or non-health benefits into consideration. Because these issues are covered
in Chapters 6, 11, and 17, we do not discuss distributive justice in general here.
Rather, we focus specifically on distributive justice issues that arise if health policy
considers indirect and non-health benefits in the priority-setting process. The
three problems on which we focus are unfairness to the economically disadvantaged, the double counting of benefits, and disagreement regarding which non-
health benefits are valuable.
Unfairness to the Economically Disadvantaged
Some may worry that considering indirect benefits will be unfair to economically
disadvantaged people whose health could be improved if they receive direct health
benefits. In her defense of prioritizing direct benefits, Kamm argues that considering indirect benefits is unjust because it denies treatment to some on the
grounds that they are not a useful means to the good of others;4 Brock makes similar arguments.3
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We agree that it is undesirable to further burden the economically disadvantaged.
Chapters 9 and 11 offer compelling arguments in support of this claim. However,
consideration of one prominent category of indirect benefits is unlikely to impose disproportionate burdens on the economically disadvantaged. This category
comprises benefits that are not downstream consequences of economic activity by
the direct beneficiary, but are instead a side effect of the provision of treatment.2
Examples of such benefits include the income obtained by the numerous individuals involved in health care provision (ranging from surgeons to administrative
workers to janitors), the experience gained by those individuals, and the scientific
knowledge gained through case reports. Considering these benefits would not disfavor the economically disadvantaged.
A different category of indirect benefits is more likely to implicate Kamm’s concern about disadvantaging the already disadvantaged. This category comprises
benefits “obtained by a third party as a result of the fact that the resource is given
to a direct beneficiary,” which du Toit and Millum illustrate using the example
of dependent children who benefit indirectly from direct health benefits to their
parents.7 We will call this category “recipient-produced benefits.” However, du
Toit and Millum argue that, even if counting recipient-produced benefits to dependent children disadvantages the childless, not counting (or giving less weight
to) such benefits fails to take proper account of children’s interests. Similarly, even
if counting recipient-produced benefits to a community from keeping a productive
person alive disadvantages the unproductive, not counting those benefits at all
ignores the interests of other individuals in the community, including those who
may be disadvantaged. The defender of ignoring recipient-produced benefits, or
giving them less weight, must explain why our responsibility to avoid ignoring
those who are not useful is more important than our responsibility to help those
who we can only help indirectly. Put another way, even if considering recipient-
produced benefits may sometimes make it less likely that disadvantaged people
will receive direct health benefits, considering recipient-produced benefits could
improve their prospects of receiving benefits overall, by improving their prospects
of receiving indirect benefits. We should always carefully assess the overall distributional impact of considering indirect benefits, and not merely assume that
doing so hurts the disadvantaged.
As du Toit and Millum also observe, it is unclear whether considering recipient-
produced benefits will systematically disadvantage those already badly off. For
instance, consideration of recipient-produced benefits need not prioritize CEOs
over ordinary workers, because many CEOs, though productive, are inessential—
someone else could step into the CEO position with little loss of long-term
productivity.
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Lastly, sometimes the worst-
off will be the most effective at generating
recipient-produced benefits, because the marginal gain of benefiting the worst-off
is greater: for instance, a reduction in copayments that improves the economic
status of a poor worker by $1,000 may provide dramatically more benefit than
improving the economic status of a wealthier individual by the same amount.
Ultimately, counting non-health benefits need not compound disadvantage: the
existence of any relationship is an empirical and contingent question.
Double Counting and Comparison
It is important to ensure that the same benefits are not being double counted as
both health and non-health benefits, nor are they being counted in more than
one category of non-health benefit. For instance, previous versions of disability-
adjusted life-year (DALY) approaches justified age weighting, in part on the basis
that individuals at certain ages (in particular adulthood and middle age) do more
to promote the flourishing of others in society than do individuals who are very
young or very old.17 When a metric includes both health and non-health benefits,
as was previously true of DALYs, it is important not to double count non-health
benefits, for instance by conducting an extended cost-effectiveness analysis that
gives weight both to old-style DALYs and to productivity.
More generally, once health policy begins to consider benefits other than
health, it must identify some methodology by which non-health benefits can
be compared to health benefits. One common approach involves regarding
health and non-health benefits as commensurable in terms of some foundational “currency” of value, such as well-being, resources, monetary wealth, or
capabilities.10 Others have offered procedures for setting priorities without
commensurability.18
Disagreement
Most individuals believe that health is valuable, but disagree about the value of
specific non-health benefits. For instance, some individuals and societies place
higher priority on religious enlightenment, or access to the arts, than do others.
As such, counting non-health benefits presents health policy with the problem of
disagreement among citizens. One way of reducing such disagreements involves
providing non-health benefits that are either all-purpose goods or widely agreed
to be basic needs. All-purpose goods—goods that people want “whatever else they
want”19—include income and wealth. Goods widely agreed to be human needs include goods like basic education, food, and shelter.
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Implications
Economic Evaluation of Health Policy
Chapters 5 through 8 discuss four different approaches to the economic evaluation
of health policy: cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA), extended cost-effectiveness
analysis (ECEA), benefit-cost analysis (BCA), and the social welfare function (SWF)
approach. Of these theories, BCA has the easiest time incorporating indirect and
non-health benefits, since it converts all categories of benefit to a common currency, monetary value, before comparing them to costs. However, this ease comes
with the challenge of securing agreement on the monetary value of benefits.
However, ECEA can also incorporate non-health benefits without converting
them to a common currency if it includes non-health benefits as well as quality-
adjusted life-years (QALYs) or DALYs in its evaluation of the benefits of an intervention. The challenge for ECEA is to determine which non-health benefits should
be considered, and what priority to give different types of benefits.
Like ECEA, the SWF approach can incorporate non-health benefits by adding
them to the “attribute bundle” against which a policy’s effects on individuals are
evaluated. Chapter 8 describes a SWF that includes only health, longevity, and income, as well as a more “ambitious” SWF that also includes other characteristics.
The attributes considered are then combined into a utility function.
Traditional CEA will have the most difficult time incorporating non-health
benefits. Indeed, a problem for traditional CEA is that if we consider costs (including non-health costs) when deciding which health interventions receive priority, it is difficult to see why we should not also consider non-health benefits. For
instance, if reducing the incidence of a communicable disease through pesticide
spraying costs $10,000 per QALY, while reducing it through a combination of environmental remediation plus spraying costs $12,000 per QALY but also produces
an extra $4,000 worth of non-health benefits for each QALY saved (for instance,
because the environmental remediation also improves agricultural productivity),
it seems myopic to focus only on the higher overall costs of environmental remediation while ignoring its greater overall benefits. One possibility is that CEA could,
as is often done, reframe forgone non-health benefits as opportunity costs of
turning down other alternatives, although incorporating such opportunity costs
into CEA threatens to break down the distinction between CEA and BCA.
Overall, the approach suggested in this chapter favors ECEA, BCA, or an ambitious SWF approach over traditional CEA approaches. While consequentialist,
commensurability-based approaches like BCA are the most prominent way of integrating non-health and indirect benefits into priority-setting, it should also be
possible to systematically integrate non-health and indirect benefits without reducing them to monetary values.
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Health System Design and Financing
Consideration of indirect and non-health benefits will bear on the question of how
health systems should be designed, in particular issues related to copayments and
public finance. Eliminating or reducing copayments increases the cost of providing
an intervention but can raise its non-health benefits by functioning as a monetary
transfer that prevents poverty, thereby also indirectly improving the health of the
beneficiary and of others. Apart from preventing poverty, the monetary transfer
can also improve the financial status of health care recipients. It is important that
ECEA approaches are clear about the value they assign to different indirect and
non-health benefits (e.g., poverty prevention as opposed to prevention of monetary losses) of public financing of health care. Decision-makers then must consider whether they endorse this valuation.
Decisions about health care financing at the international level may also
depend on how non-health and indirect benefits are considered. Publicly financing access to health care for people who are economically disadvantaged
is more likely to produce certain non-health benefits, such as poverty prevention, and could therefore strengthen the case for global health aid to the economically disadvantaged. On the other hand, financing access to health care
for people likely to be economically productive is an effective way of producing
other non-health benefits, such as economic growth. This presents the question of whether and how international funders should consider non-health and
indirect benefits when setting priorities among different nations that are potential recipients of funding.

Conclusion
Social and professional norms frequently lead individuals involved in the health
care system, from patients to providers to policymakers, to adopt a tunnel-vision
approach that attends only to one aspect of the health care system—the health
benefits (and potential harms) directly experienced by patients because of health
care interventions offered by providers. In contrast, the myriad other effects of
the health care system are frequently ignored entirely, and generally given a much
lower priority. The lack of empirical research that considers indirect and non-
health benefits further encourages a tunnel-vision approach.
This chapter has argued that the tunnel-vision approach is mistaken. Health
policy should ensure that its evidence base for interventions considers effects
other than direct health effects, and should put more resources into conducting
empirical studies that take a broad approach to social costs and benefits. Health
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policymakers should also collaborate with other policymakers in order to learn
about and more effectively weigh the non-health impacts of health interventions.
And they should be sensitive to normative issues that arise uniquely, or tend to
arise more often, with non-health effects than within the domain of health. An
approach to health policy that considers non-health benefits will more effectively
improve the lives of the individuals it serves, whether by increasing health or
improving its distribution.
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